



Betting on Election.-Rich v. State, 42 S. W, Rep. 291 (Tex.). Defend-
ant proposed to bet $25 on an election and the other party to the bet put up
$5, agreeing that they should be forfeited if the remaining $20 were not put up
within a specified time. The $5 were forfeited to the defendant. Held, that
such action did not constitute a betting on an election. "A bet is a wager and
the betting is complete when the offer to bet is accepted" (State v. Welch, 7
Port. 465).
Indictment-Abatement-Presence of Stenografiher in GrandJury Room.
-State v. Bates, et al., 48 N. E. Rep. 2 (Ind.). The mere presence of a
stenographer at the examination of witnesses before a grand jury, for the pur-
pose of taking evidence on which the indictment is to be founded, furnishes no
ground for abating the indictment, unless accused has been prejudiced
thereby. The statute (sec. 1724, Burns' Rev. St., i894) expressly gives the
grand jury the right to appoint one of their own number to take down the evi-
dence given before them, and preserve it for use in the prosecution. But
there is no statute authorizing any other person to remain in the room and
take the evidence in short hand, nor any statute prohibiting it. In the federal
courts, which also are subject to no such statute, the presence of a stenog-
rapher does not invalidate the indictment (U. S. v. Simmons, 46 Fed. 65; also,
Courtney v. State, 5 Ind. App. 356, 32 N. E. 335). In State v. Clough, 49
Me., on p. 576, the court said: "The mere fact that a stenographer was pres-
ent when an indictment was found would not render it void." But see contra,
State v. Bowman, 38 Ad. 331, a Maine case, reported on page 9r, Vol. VII.,
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Invalidity of Sentence-Omission of Hard Labor-Habeas Corpus-Ex.
tent of Relief Granted.-In re Christian, 82 Fed. Rep. 199. Petitioner had
been convicted under Section 5392 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which imposed as a penalty fine and imprisonment at hard labor, and
was sentenced to pay a fine and to imprisonment, "hard labor" being omitted
from the sentence. Held, that petitioner should be released on habeas corpus,
but without prejudice to the right of the United States to have him properly
re-sentenced, even though he had partly satisfied the sentence by payment of
the fine. In Harman v. U. S., 50 Fed. 922, Caldwell, J., said: "It seems
probable that if the plaintiff had sought relief from the void sentence, after
suffering part of the punishment, by habeas corpus, his discharge would have
been absolute and final." See Exfiarte Lange, ig Wall. 163; In rejohnson,
46 Fed. 477. This dictum seems to be disproved in In re Bonner, 154 U. S.
243, 14 Sup. Ct. 323. Other cases are Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 175, 1o
Sup. Ct. 384; Savage, Petitioner, 134 U. S. r76, 1o Sup. Ct. 389; also, Exjiarte
Friday, 43 Fed. 916.
View by Jury-Conversation with Passer-by.-State v. Perry, 27 S. E.
Rep. 997 (N. C.). Held, that although the fact that the jury, without leave of
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the court, went to view the scene of the crime, may not be ground for a new
trial; yet a new trial will be granted because, while so doing, they interrogated
a passer-by as to the identity of a certain house, whose distance from the
scene of the crime was material. There is a difference of opinion between
the authorities as to whether the prisoner must accompany the jury in their
inspection of the premises (" Thomp. Trials," sections 886, 887); but all concur
that evidence cannot be taken on such occasions. The settled practice is for
the court to appoint "showers," but merely for the purpose of pointing out
the locality ("Thomp. Trials," sec. 914; "Bailey, Proc." 228; State v.-Lofiez, 15
Nev. 407). While there is conflict upon the point, it has been held, as in Peo-
file v. IJoe, 62 Cal. 291, that the bare fact of the jury having visited the
scene of a capital offense, with the trial of which they are charged, though
made without leave of the court, is not fier se ground for a new trial. Some
prejudice must appear, as in the present case. State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 5 13.
Aggravated Assault-Instructions to the Jury.-Grayson v. State, 42
S. W. Rep. 293 (Tex.). A jury was charged that if the evidence tended to
show that the assault was made with premeditated design, and by the use of
means calculated to inflict great bodily injury, the defendant was guilty of an
aggravated assault. Held, erroneous. An assault and battery, to become
aggravated, must result in serious bodily injury or such an injury as is attended
with danger.
Burglary-Allegation in Indictment as to the Ownershi of Profierty.-
Lamater v. State, 42 S. W. Rep, 304 (Tex.). In an indictment for burglary
it was alleged that an entry was made into a school building with intent to
steal certain property belonging to the janitor of the building. The court
charged the jury that, "A person who is in the direct control of a house, and
exclusive management and control of property, is, for the purposes of law, the
occupant of such house and owner of such property." ield, such charge was
authorized, notwithstanding the general property was shown to bein the pupils'.
CARRIERS.
Connecting Carriers-Duties-Limitation of Liability-Through Shifi-
ments.-Birdet al. v. Southern Ky Co., 42 S. W. Rep. 451 (Tenn.). Plaintiff
consigned a box of fruit trees to a place by a route covering parts of three
connecting and distinct lines of railway. When the intermediate carrier de-
livered the trees to the ultimate carrier, the latter immediately informed the
intermediate carrier that the destination was a prepay station and that they
would not forward the trees until all charges were paid. Thereupon the inter-
mediate carrier took no action for eighteen days, as a consequence of which the
trees became worthless. Intermediate carrier held liable. An intermediate
carrier is entitled to any exemption contained in a bill of lading issued by the
initial carrier, Halliday v. R'y Co., 70 Mo. 159; but such exemption does not
relieve him from responsibility for his own negligence. The intermediate car-
rier was charged with a duty to inform either the shippers or the initial carrier
that the destination was a prepay station and in not doing so was guilty of
negligence.
Carriers- Who are Passengers.-MlcNulty v. Penn. R. R. Co., 38 AU.
Rep. 524 (Penn.). Plaintiff's husband contracted with the defendant company
to do certain work upon a bridge on its line of railway, the company agreeing
to pay him $1.20 per day and to transport him to and from his home to the
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place where the work was to be performed. While being thus transported he
was killed by a freight train crashing into the rear of the passenger car in
which he was riding. Held, in an action by the plaintiff to recover for the
death of her husband, that when the deceased entered the train for carriage
he ceased to be an employee, but, under the contract, became a passenger.
Consequently the rule regarding co-employee did not apply and therefore the
negligence of the engineer of the freight train in causing the collision did not
relieve the company. But see Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Jones, 75 U. S. 439,
Chase's Cases on Torts, p. 223.
Carriage by Sea-Excefitions in Contract-Negligence-jettison of Cae-
tle.-Comfiaina de Navzigacion La F-lecha v. Brauer et al., 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.
12. In an action in admiralty against a steam navigation company, it
appeared that a certain number of cattle were received under a bill of lading
stipulating that they were to be "at owner's risk; steamer not to be held lia-
ble for accident to or mortality of the animals, from whatever cause arising."
During the trip the vessel encountered some rough weather and the master
and crew, becoming panic-stricken, drove overboard 126 head of cattle. Such
action appearing from the testimony to be unnecessary and due to the incom-
petency of the crew, held, that there could be a recovery. The ordinary con-
tract of a common carrier by sea involves an obligation on his part to use due
care and skill in navigating the vessel and in carrying the goods. An excep-
tion, in a bill of lading, of perils of the sea, or other specified perils, does not
excuse him from that obligation, nor exempt him from one of those perils, to
which the negligence of himself or his servants has contributed. N. .. Steam
Nav. Co., v. Aerchants B'k, 6 How 344. Transfiortation Co. v. Downer,
ii Wall. 129. A similar English case is that of Lenro v. Dudgeon, 17 Law
T. (N. S.) 145.
CONTRACTS.
Landlord and Tenant-Coal Leases-Znterfiretation-Liability of Les-
see for Royalty.- Wright et al. v. Warrior Run Coal Co., 38 Atl. Rep. 491(Pa.). Plaintiff leased to defendants certain coal lands. The lease provided
for the payment of a royalty of fifteen cents per ton for all coals mined above
the size of chestnut coal, seven and one-half cents for the chestnut, and noth-
ing on the smaller sizes. At the time of the making of the contract there were
mined and marketed in that locality seven sizes of coal, including the chestnut.
Of the total amount produced, fifteen per cent. was chestnut and nine per cent.
smaller, both of which were the incidental product of preparing the other
sizes. The demand was greatest for the larger sizes, and very slight for the
chestnut. After a few years the demand for the larger sizes diminished, and
for the smaller sizes increased to such an extent that it became profitable to
produce a greater proportion of smaller coal. In preparing this by breaking
up the larger sizes a greater proportion of chestnut and smaller coal was nec-
essarily produced, which also found a profitable market In an action by the
plaintiffs to recover a royalty on the increased production of the chestnut and
smaller sizes, the court hekl that for all chestnut above fifteen per cent, and
smaller coal above nine per cent, the average of each produced at the creation
of the contract, the lessee should pay a royalty of fifteen cents per ton.
Mitchell, J., (dissenting) held the royalty should not be allowed, inasmuch as
it was in effect "making a new contract for the parties, in the light of subse-
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quent events, in place of the one they made for themselves." In his opinion
the lessees could have reduced the whole production of the mines to the small-
est size on which the full royalty was paid, and still not be liable for an in-
creased royalty on the incidental product.
Note to joint Payees-Transfer of Interest-Liability.-Bond v. Hollo-
way, 47 N. E. Rep. 838 (Ind.). Defendant, one of two joint payees of a nego-
tiable note, by a writing on the back thereof, assigned over his interest to his
co-payee, who in turn sold the note to plaintiff's decedent. Held, that the
assignment was a mere transfer of assignor's interest, and not an unrestricted
and unqualified indorsement. The case appears to be a novel one, and no de-
cisions directly in point are cited. The common law rule that where two persons,
not partners, were payees of a promissory note, an indorsement by both was
necessary to pass title (2 Pars. Bills and N. 4) has been modified in many juris-
dictions to the effect that a part of a written contract may be assigned.
Grover v. Ruby, 24 Ind. 418; 2 Story Eq. Jur., §1044. But such assignment
has nowhere been held to be an unqualified indorsement. On the contrary, it
has been held in such a case that the co-payee, or his assignee, cannot main-
tain an action on the assignment as an indorsement. x Daniel Neg. Inst. p.
629; Carrick v. Vickey, 2 Doug. 653, note; Foster v. Hill, 36 N. H. 526;
Chit. Bills 57. In Michigan the negotiable character of a promissory note is
destroyed by an indorsement by a payee transferring only his interest to
another. Anmiba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich. I7i. But see Vincent v. Horlickr,
Camp. 442; Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala. 536; Lyman v. Clark Mass. 235;
Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 325. In the present case the language of the assign-
ment shows only an intention to transfer defendant's. interest in the note, and
is not an indorsement which charged him as indorser under the law merchant.
This fact being patent upon the face of the writing, all subsequent purchasers
were chargeable with notice thereof.
Beneficial Associations-Change of Beneficiary.-Fischer v. Fischer, 42
S. W. Rep. 448 (Tenn.). A beneficiary in a life insurance policy paid the
assessments on the policy for several years. The insured then caused the policy
to read in favor of another beneficiary in his place. Held. such action was
permissible when not in violation of the by-laws of the company. The rights
of the holder and beneficiary are to be found in the laws of the company or
order, and no interest does or can rest in a beneficiary so as to defeat this
right.
DIVORCE.
Decree-Prohibition of Use of Husband's Are-Injunction.-Blanc v.
Blanc, 47 N. Y. Sup. 694. A decree granting a divorce between husband and
wife, which also provided that the defendant should be prohibited from using
her husband's name, or any part of it, cannot be attacked collaterally in a suit
between the same parties on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the court to
decree such a prohibition. Such a decree is valid, and where the wife subse-
quently uses her husband's name for theatrical purposes, though not in private
life, she may be fined for contempt of court, though she used the name under
advice of counsel. Where the decree of divorce is still in effect, an injunction
restraining the divorced wife from using her former husband's name, will be
denied as unnecessary.
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Subsequent Award of Alimony-Jurisdiction-Effect of Marriage of
Defendan.-Hekkingv. Pfaff, 82 Fed. Rep. 403. Plaintiff, a resident of South
Dakota, had obtained a decree of divorce in the courts of that State against
defendant, a resident of Massachusetts and not under the jurisdiction of the
court granting the divorce. No alimony was allowed by this decree. Defen-
dant thereafter married again, and plaintiff subsequently obtained leave
to have the decree opened, and filed an amended bill alleging grounds
for alimony that had arisen since the original decree. In an action
brought on a decree thereby obtained granting alimony, held, that the
latter decree was void, and that defendant's subsequent marriage did not pre-
vent him, either as a ratification, waiver or estoppel, from denying the juris-
diction or authority of the court to open the decree and award alimony against
him.
CIVIL RIGHTS.
Civil Rigts-Restaurant Keepers-Colored Guests-Master and Serv-
ant.-Bryan v. Adler, 72 N. W. 368 (Wis.). A Wisconsin statute makes
restaurant keepers liable to the person aggrieved, for refusal, or aiding or in-
citing a refusal to anyone of every race and color, the full enjoyment and
privileges of their restaurant. Under such a statute, a restaurant keeper is
liable to a colored guest whom the waiter refused to serve on account of his
color, even though the restaurant keeper did not aid nor incite the refusal, but
had in fact commanded the waiter to serve the guest and had afterward dis-
charged him for the refusal. It is well settled that a master is liable for an
injury done by a servant, whether through negligence or malice, when en-
gaged in the discharge of a duty which the master owes to the person injured.
Croker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657. Compensatory damages may be recov-
ered without the master ratifying the act. Sfialding v. Railway Co., 33 Wis.
582; but it is otherwise if,exemplary damages are sought to be recovered.
Bass v. Railway Co., 39 Wis. 636.
Racing Association-Rules of Jockey Club-Reasonableness-Amuse-
ments.-Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 47 N. E. Rep. 896 (N. Y.).
Defendant had ruled plaintiff off .the turf and excluded him from attendance
at a subsequent race, for which he had purchased a ticket, because of a bribe
offered by him to jockeys in a race, in violation of a rule of the jockey club,
declaring such act a dishonest practice and violation of its rules. Defendant
was an association organized under Ch. 570, .Laws 1895, which licensed it to
conduct races for a stake upon condition that all running race meetings should
be conducted by it subject to the reasonable rules of the jockey club. Held,
that the rule in question is not unreasonable; is not a restriction upon the
rights of the public in a franchise enjoyed by the association; violates no con-
tract, takes away no property, and interferes with no vested right. Also, that
the exclusion of an offender is not limited to the particular day on which the
offense occurred, and that such exclusion is not violative of Laws 1895, c.
1042, relating to the equal rights of all persons at places of amusement, etc.
Compare Civil Rights Cases 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Corfiarations-Afifrofriation of Assets-Individual Indebtedness.-
Mt. Verd Mills Co. v. McElwee, 42 S. W. Rep. 465 (Tenn.). Defendant re-
ceived from his brother, the secretary and treasurer of an incorporated corn-
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pany, several small checks in settlement of his (the secretary's) indebtedness,
and drawn in his official capacity. The checks were charged to defendant and
thne company sued to recover value. Held, defendant was liable. The rule
that one partner cannot give a partnership check without the assent of the
other partners, in payment of his individual debt, as found in Rogers v. Bet-
terton, 93 Tenn. 63o, 27 S. W. X017, applies in this case.
Negligence of Attorney- Liability-Measure of Damages.-Fay v.
McGuire, et al., 47 N. Y. Supp. 286. The defendants, who were attorneys,
represented to plaintiff, their client, that a mortgage which they had obtained for
him upon certain property was a first lien. Plaintiff foreclosed and took a
purchase-money mortgage from the purchaser. The purchaser subsequently
made a contract to sell the property, but could not until he had paid certain
prior incumbrances and liens on the property, which the defendants had not
discovered. He claimed, and the plaintiff paid him half the sum expended in
clearing the property. Held, that defendants were liable to the plaintiff, who
was entitled to be put as nearly as possible in the position which he would
have occupied if his mortgage had been a first lien. The measure of damages
was the sum paid in removing prior incumbrances.
Cofiyright-Subjects of Cofyrigh-Price Catalogue.-. L. Mrott Iroyt
Works v. Clow et aL, 82 Fed. 316. Plaintiffs, who were manufacturers of
plumbers' supplies, had issued an illustrated catalogue of their wares, which
was largely copied by defendants, a rival concern.. Held, that an injunction
would not lie to restrain defendants from further publication of their catalogue,
as the original cuts were of articles which could not be the subject of artistic
treatment, and the letter-press was confined to a description of the wares, and
of no artistic merit, and hence not entitled to be copyrighted. The object of
the constitutional provision is to promote the dissemination of learning by pro-
tecting works which promote general knowledge in science and useful arts.
It is not intended as a protection to traders in the particular manner in which
they may shout their wares. In Hotten v. Arthur, i Hem. & vi, 603, the
court ruled in favor of the copyright of a catalogue of curious books, not on
the ground that it was an advertisement, but that it contained original matter.
But in Cobbett v Woodward, L. R., 14 Eq. 407, an injunction was denied
where the catalogue infringed contained engravings of furniture, with remarks
of description. This case was' flatly overruled in Ma3le 6- Co. v. Junior
Army & Navy Stores, 21 Ch. Div. 369. The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, has expressly approved of Cobbett v. Woodward, sufira.
See Baker v. Selden, ioi U. S. 99, o5; Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382, Fed.
Cas. 2872. See, alio, Jeweler's Mercantile Agency v. Rothschild, 39 N. Y.
Supp. 700, reported in Vol. VI., No i, of the YALE LAW JOURNAL.
A uction-Reresentations-Descrition of Incumbrance.-Blanck v,
Sadler, 47 N. E. Rep. 920 (N. Y.), Plaintiff purchased premises, at a public
auction, which were stated to be subject to a mortgage of a certain amount, at
a certain rate of interest and having a certain time to run. No further repre-
sentations as to the terms of the mortgage were made at the time. On subse-
quently looking up the title plaintiff discovered a clause securing payment of
the mortgage in gold coin, -' of the present standard of weight and fineness."
Held, two judges dissenting, that this clause did not constitute such a variance
from the incumbrance described as to justify purchaser in rejecting the title.
He was notified of the existence of the mortgage, but made no inquiry as to.
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whether it contained special terms. In view of the fact that the government
is pledged to maintain the parity of treasury notes and silver and gold coin,
it cannot be assumed, that if the contract is completed any additional burden
will be imposed upon the plaintiff by this clause. The dissenting opinion
maintains that a contract to pay for property, or the taking subject to an obli-
gation, are assumed to be dischargeable in any kind of legal tender (fuilliard
v. Greenman, 11o U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122). The sale in the present case
was at the Real Estate Exchange, which is attended by a large number of bid-
ders. If it was intended to sell the property subject to a mortgage not pay-
able in legal tender, it should have been so stated in the terms of sale. Any
other rule would compel bidders to search titles before they could safely bid at
the exchange.
Action for Fraud-Evidence-Comjfetency-Declaration Showing In-
.ten.-Zimmerman v. Brannon, 72 N. W. Rep. 439 (Iowa). Statements by
defendants as to the condition of a lot of hogs they were attempting to sell,
made to former prospective purchasers, may be shown by plaintiff, a subse-
quent purchaser, in an action alleging fraud in the sale of the hogs, as evi-
dence of the seller's intent in making representations to him. And when de-
fendants falsely stated that the hogs came from one stock-yard, when in fact they
came from another where there had been hog cholera, it may be shown in an
action for fraud as evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the condition of
the hogs.
Navigable Waters-Bridges-Eminent Domain.-U. S. v. City of
Aoline, 82 Fed, Rep. 592. Congress may assume jurisdiction over a naviga-
ble river lying wholly in one State, and may order obstructions to navigation
therein removed, even though these obstructions have been authorized by the
State. This right does not fer se exempt the government of the United States
from the duty of making just compensation for such property rights as are
taken. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622. But
a stipulation in the grant of a franchise to maintain a toll bridge over such
river, that the legislature may at some future time direct a draw to be placed
in the bridge, implies that the change shall be made without compensation by
the State, and inures to the benefit of the United States, once Congress has
declared the river within its jurisdiction.
Estates in Exfiectaney--Grant-Agreement to Convey-Consideration
-Family Settlement.-In re Lennig's Estate, 38 AtI. Rep. 466 (Pa.). Decedent
left a will wherein she bequeathed her whole estate to a daughter and two
granddaughters. Appellant, a son of decedent, claims one-third of the fund
as trustee for his children, by virtue of a paper duly executed by the three
legatees during the life of testatrix, the contents of the will being known to all
parties at the time. This paper was in effect an agreement that the fund
should be divided into three parts, one part to go to the daughter, another to
the two granddaughters, the third to appellant as trustee. Held. that an
estate in expectancy is not the subject of a grant, and that an agreement to
convey such estate is not enforceable as a contract, in the absence of a valua-
ble consideration. The agreement in the present case is not such valuable
-consideration, as being a family settlement, there being no controversy, or
dispute, or adverse title. Neither did the agreement of appellant with legatees
that he or his children would not further solicit testatrix to make a testa-
mentary disposition in their favor constitute such valuable consideration.
